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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF AIR SECURITY
UNITED STATES INITIATIVES
CHARLES N. BROWERt
0 NE DOES NOT have to recite at length the events of recent
years - the Olympic Village attack at Munich, acts of aircraft
sabotage, letter bombs, sniper activity, the kidnapping of diplomats - to
become conscious that in an increasing number of situations individuals
and groups are resorting to the relatively simple expedient of violence
as they pursue their goals. Aerial hijacking is a prime weapon for
those who adhere to the technique of violence because civil aviation
is uniquely vulnerable. One is hard-pressed to think of a situation
in which so many persons can become hostages to the demands of
others as quickly as can a group of passengers on'board an aircraft
flying at 35,000 feet.
International aviation law has developed remarkably in response
to the hijacking alarm. A first step was taken in 1963 with the
adoption of the Tokyo Convention, a convention primarily devoted
to establishing the rights and obligations of the aircraft commander
to maintain good order on board the aircraft, and to clarifying the rules
of jurisdiction for crimes committed on board.' In preparatory meet-
ings leading to the plenipotentiary conference at Tokyo, the United
States proposed an article dealing with hijacked passengers, crew,
cargo, and the aircraft itself. The proposal, as ultimately adopted,
obliged the state in which the aircraft landed to "permit its passen-
gers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable, and
...return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled
to possession." The United States did not press for rules dealing
with treatment of the hijackers themselves nor with the question
t Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. Member of the
New York and District of Columbia Bars. A.B., Harvard University, 1957,
LL.B., 1961.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Franklin K. Willis of the Office
of the Legal Advisor for his assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 (effective Dec. 4,
1969) [hereinafter cited as Tokyo Convention]. See generally Boyle & Pulsifer,
The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 305 (1964) ; Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The
International and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV.
509 (1967). Earlier drafts of the convention are analyzed in FitzGerald, The
Development of International Rules Concerning Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 230 (1963).
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of noncomplying states. There was little hope for sympathetic consid-
eration of such proposals at that time because hijacking was con-
sidered by others to be a uniquely American problem rather than a
generalized threat to all civil aviation. The American proposal became
article II of the Tokyo Convention, which entered into force in 1969.2
A second step was taken in 1968, when preparatory work began
in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on a con-
vention concerning treatment of hijackers. This work culminated in
the adoption of the Hague Convention in 1970.' The key provisions
of this convention are articles 4, 6, 7, and 8. Article 4 imposes a
mandatory obligation on parties to establish their criminal juris-
diction over the offense, without regard to the state of registration
of the hijacked aircraft or the place where the act occurred.4 Article 6
requires contracting states to take offenders into custody whenever
found in their territory5 and article 8 establishes a basis for extradition
2. See Report of the United States Delegation to the Fourteenth Session of
the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization, submitted to
the Secretary of State, May 23, 1963, by the Chairman of the Delegation, pp. 14-16.
Article 11 of the Convention states:
1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof
an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an air-
craft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States
shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its
lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting State
in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue theirjourney as soon as practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its cargo to the
persons lawfully entitled to possession.
Tokyo Convention, supra note 1.
The United States has taken the position that this rule is analogous to the
rule applicable to mariners in distress, and, therefore, reflects a general principle of
international law binding on all states. See Rhinelander, The International Law of
Aerial Piracy - New Proposals for the New Dimension, in AERIAL PIRACY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 59, 64 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971) ; McWhinney, International
Legal Problem-Solving and the Practical Dilemma of Hijacking, in AERIAL PIRACY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 21-22 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971); cf. note 10 infra.
3. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (effective Oct. 14, 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
4. Article 4 provides in part:
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the case where the alleged offender
is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8
to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Id.
5. Article 6 provides in pertinent part:
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting
State in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present,
shall take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence . ...
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among parties.6 Article 7 sets out one of the most sweeping obligations
known to international criminal law :7
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged,
without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense
was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law of that State.8
The net effect of these four articles should be to eliminate all
sanctuaries for hijackers when the convention is widely ratified. The
convention's extradite-or-prosecute obligation admits of no exception.
The decision to prosecute must be made "in the same manner as in the
case of any ordinary offense of a serious nature,"9 a clear indication by
the Hague conferees that the political nature of an act cannot justify
avoidance of prosecution.
The Hague Conference also strengthened the Tokyo rule with
respect to hijacked passengers and crew by requiring states to facilitate
the continuation of their journey rather than merely to permit continua-
tion, thereby converting a passive obligation into an affirmative duty
to aid.1 °
6. Article 8 provides:
1. The offence shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting States
undertake to include the offence as an extraditable offence in every extradition
treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting State
with which it has no extradition treaty, it may at its option consider this Con-
vention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extradition
shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested
State.
3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the existence
of a treaty shall recognize the offence as an extraditable offence between them-
selves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.
Id.
7. Cf. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 49, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, [19551
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365; Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29,
1958, art. 19, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
8. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 7.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. The conferees also added the words "without delay," in a further strengthen-
ing of the Tokyo rule. Article 9 reads in part:
2. In the cases contemplated by the preceding paragraph, any Contracting State
in which the aircraft or its passengers or crew are present shall facilitate the
1022 [VOL. 18 : p. 985
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A third measure to promote air security via the strengthening
of international law was proposed by the United States and others
in the wake of two acts of sabotage in February 1970, one of which
cost 47 lives." That proposal was for a convention, complementary to
the Hague Convention, to deal with other acts of violence against civil
aviation.'" Preparatory work began in late 1970 and concluded at
Montreal in 1971 with adoption of the Convention on Sabotage and
Other Attacks on Aircraft.' 3  That convention contained the same
key provisions as the Hague Convention - the absolute extradite-or-
prosecute obligation and a mandatory rule of universal jurisdiction -
for acts of sabotage, other acts of violence against persons on board
aircraft, and destruction of aircraft.
The three basic conventions on aviation security were adopted
without dissent, and states are rapidly subscribing to them. Forty-two
states signed the Tokyo Convention, and 63 are parties as of this date.
The Hague Convention, which entered into force 9 months after adop-
tion, was signed by 81 states, and 52 have become parties. The
Montreal Convention, completed just a little over 16 months ago, has
received 61 signatures and already 21 states have become party to it.
It entered into force on January 26, 1973.1'
I believe the achievements in international law in setting out basic
rules of state conduct with respect to hijackings, along with important
preventative steps which have been taken on the domestic level, such
as the ground security measures outlined by Assistant Secretary Davis,"
continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable,
and shall without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully
entitled to possession.
Id., art. 9.
11. The two acts, one involving a Swissair aircraft and the other an AustrianAirlines aircraft, occurred on February 21, 1970. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1972, at
1, col. 4.
12. The events led to a request by 11 European countries for 'an ExtraordinarySession of the ICAO Assembly to consider the problem of aviation security. Inpreparatory work for the Assembly, which met in Montreal, June 16-30, 1970, theUnited States submitted a proposal for a complimentary convention to the proposedHijacking Convention to cover sabotage and other violent acts directed against inter-
national aviation. ICAO Doc. A17-WP, April 30, 1970. The United Kingdom,Israel, and others submitted similar proposals. The Assembly unanimously adopted
a resolution directing the ICAO Legal Committee to meet no later than November1970 to draft the convention, with a view to calling a diplomatic conference notlater than the summer of 1971. The schedule was followed. The Legal Committee
met in London in September and October 1970 and produced a draft. The Con-
vention on Sabotage was formally adopted and opened for signature at Montreal
on September 23, 1971.
13. Formally, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful ActsAgainst the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, [ ] U.S.T ... , T.I.A.S.
No. 7570 (effective Jan. 26, 1973).
14. The United States deposited notes of ratification of the Tokyo Convention onSeptember 5, 1969, of the Hague Convention on September 14, 1971, and of theMontreal Convention on November 1, 1972.
15. Davis, The Government's Response to Hijacking, 18 L. REv. 1012 (1973).
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have been instrumental in producing a general reduction in the incidence
of hijacking; but, at the same time, one must admit a certain sense
of frustration at the seemingly irrepressible character of this persistent
problem. Many solutions have been offered: (1) more complete
passenger searches; (2) increased use of electronic scanning equip-
ment; and (3) prohibition of all carry-on items. I recall one solution
put forward not too long ago by a cartoon illustrator in the New Yorker
magazine. The cartoon showed a long line of naked passengers board-
ing an aircraft, and one passenger saying to his wife: "I know it's
humiliating, Alice, but you'll have to admit it works."
The defect in complete and singular reliance on a weapons-
screening system is that it can never be 100 per cent effective. While
we can establish a thorough inspection system at domestic airports,
there are inherent limitations to what we can accomplish abroad.
Magnetometer cost, manpower shortage, and other factors influence
the measures foreign governments will adopt. The vulnerability of
aircraft and aircraft passengers provides a continuing incentive for
those who choose violent methods to accomplish their goals. In short,
it seems likely that some hijackers will find a way to board aircraft.
A second solution is available when a hijacker escapes detection
and successfully boards the aircraft. That, simply, is to interrupt the
hijacking while in progress. When the hijacking peril peaked for
United States carriers, at the time of the Labor Day 1970 hijackings
to Cairo and Dawson's Field, Jordan, the United States adopted
a strategy of this kind - the sky marshalls program - as a temporary
measure that was part of a multi-pronged attack against air piracy.
Some countries continue to rely on this approach, as is clear from
positions taken by Israel and Ethiopia.' The risk - at least the
immediate, short term risk for the passengers and crew on board an
aircraft being hijacked - can be, of course, extremely high. For
example, a stewardess of a Soviet aircraft and a pilot of a Czechoslovak
airline have been killed." Recently, an Ethiopian flight narrowly
avoided disaster.18
I think it is the possibly ominous consequences of reliance upon
such a policy which prompted the 24-hour international strike by
pilots last June 19. Captain O'Donnell, President of the Air Line
Pilots Association, has reinforced this view.'" Put most simply, air-
craft crews see themselves caught in a fusillade of bullets if countries
16. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1972, at 2, col. 4; id., May 10, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
17. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 5; id., June 9, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
18. Id., Dec. 9, 1972, at 2, col. 4.
19. O'Donnell, Air Crimes: Perspectives from the Cockpit, 18 VILL. L. REv. 988
(1973).
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conclude that the only way all hijackings can be stopped is by stopping
them while in progress. The crew is directly threatened; the crew is
always present; the lives of the crew are always at stake. Given this
situation, one can little wonder at their efforts - by strike, threat
of strike, and boycott - to urge another policy to stop hijackings.
What pilots and their crews demand is that the basic international
rules that have been set out on aviation security be observed by all
countries; and they demand sanctions against the states which do not
observe them °.2  The Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions guar-
antee release of hijacked passengers and crew, return of aircraft and
cargo, and punishment of offenders by extradition or prosecution where
they are found. The pilots' point is neither novel nor complex: the
laws have been set out and are sufficient, but to be effective they must
be enforced.
There is a further point to keep in mind. One factor distinguishes
hijacking from almost all other violent acts. In a hijacking the criminal
is always known, and can be automatically delivered up to the au-
thorities of the country which is his objective. The usual difficulties
in suppressing crime, identifying and apprehending offenders, are not
present. Therefore, assured punishment of hijackers - in my mind,
the cure for the hijacking problem - escapes us only because states
tolerate hijackers. A solution to the hijacking problem does not involve
fulfilling an abstract goal of assuring that offenders are prosecuted,
but rather involves meeting an entirely attainable objective of assuring
the prosecution of offenders.who can be prosecuted. The hijacking
risk is run because states will not, rather than cannot, enforce the law
by prosecution.
I think these points summarize the analysis which led to United
States initiatives for an Air Security Enforcement Convention. Our
original proposal was made during the period immediately following
the 1970 Labor Day incidents. On September 11, 1970, President
Nixon announced a seven-point program to deal with air piracy.21
One of the points was that the United States would seek ways and
means for the international community to take "joint action" -
specifically, suspension of airline services - against countries which
refused to punish or extradite hijackers involved in "international black-
mail." "International blackmail," as used in this sense, refers to the
holding of passengers, crew, and aircraft as hostages to obtain com-
20. Thus the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations called a
worldwide, one-day air stoppage on June 19, 1972, to dramatize the need for sanctions
against states which do not punish hijackers. See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1972, at 1,
col. 7; id., June 9, 1972, at 1, col. 5.
21. Id., Sept. 12, 1970, at 11, col. 5.
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pliance with hijacker demands. The Secretary of State was requested
to ask the President of the Council of ICAO to convene the Council
on an emergency basis to consider a United States proposal on "joint
action."
On September 18 and 29, 1970, the ICAO Council met to con-
sider resolutions tabled by the United States and Canada. The United
States resolution called for ad hoc meetings of ICAO member-states
on request of any ICAO member for the purpose of considering "joint
action" in cases of "international blackmail" hijackings whenever pas-
sengers, crew, or aircraft were detained by a state contrary to the
principles of the Tokyo Convention, or whenever a state failed to
extradite or prosecute the hijacker contrary to the principles of the
Hague Convention on Hijacking. The resolution also requested the
Legal Committee of ICAO to begin study immediately on a convention
on "joint action. '2 2 The Canadian proposal called for amendment of
bilateral air agreements to incorporate a special clause permitting
termination of air services by one party when the other fails to
implement the obligations set out in the Tokyo Convention and "any
other ICAO Conventions in force at the relevant time."' 2 On October
1, the United States proposal was adopted by a 14 to 3 vote and the
Canadian proposal by an 18 to 0 vote.
The ICAO Legal Committee was then meeting in London
and immediately extended its session to consider the October 1
resolutions. The United States introduced a draft convention on "joint
action" and the Canadians submitted a working paper on their pro-
posal for a special clause. The draft convention has been fully discussed
elsewhere24 and I will not go into details because subsequent events
led, first, to major revisions, and, later, to an entirely new draft which
was recently approved by the Legal Committee to be sent to a diplo-
matic conference. Briefly, the draft convention established a two-step
procedure for decisions on "joint action." The first step involved a
factfinding procedure for determining whether a state was responsible
for the detention of hijacked passengers, crew, or aircraft or had
failed to take into custody, and thereafter extradite or prosecute, a
person engaged in an "international blackmail" hijacking or who had
22. For texts of the United States draft resolution and the resolution as adopted,
see 63 DEP'T STATE BULL. 453 (1970).
23. For the text of the Canadian proposal and discussion relating thereto, see Bis-
sonnett & Clark, Securing the Enforcement of International Legal Obligations Re-
lating to Unlawful Interference with International Civil Aviation: Canadian Initia-
tives, in AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 72.
24. See Rhinelander, supra note 2. For the text of the draft convention presented
by the United States delegation, see AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 2 at 183.
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caused death or physical injury to a passenger or crew member or
damage to an aircraft.25 The second step, which was conditioned upon
a finding against a state in the first stage, set out procedures for taking
decisions on joint action against that state.2" A decision on sanctions,
such as a boycott of air services, was to be binding. Decisions were
to be taken at a meeting of designated states affected by the hijacking.28
The United States proposal limited itself to "blackmail hijackings"
and others of the most serious types of unlawful interference with air-
craft - those involving death or injury to passengers or crew or
damage to aircraft - because we recognized that any formalized
procedures for sanctions against states would find acceptance only with
the greatest difficulty. The proposal was radically innovative. While
we felt it was commensurate with the seriousness of the problem facing
international aviation, and fully justified as a matter of policy and
law, it could not be denied that issues of the most important political
content were posed. The proposal dealt squarely with the issue of
state responsibility, and provided a structure in which state action could
be examined, disapproved, and punished.29
The Legal Committee examined the major issues presented by the
draft convention tabled by the United States, and then voted to estab-
lish a subcommittee to give it and the Canadian proposal a detailed
analysis.3 0
The Legal Subcommittee on the October 1 Resolutions met dur-
ing the last 2 weeks of April 1971. On the opening day of the meeting,
the United States and Canada introduced a co-sponsored draft conven-
tion which was similar to the draft which had been tabled by the United
States at the previous Legal Committee meeting, and which covered
bilateral measures that had been proposed by Canada.8 The Subcom-
mittee completed study and redrafting of the first three articles of the
eight-article draft convention during the April 1971 session and
recommended that additional time be provided for it to complete its
work. However, in June 1971, the 18th ICAO Assembly, meeting
25. See AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 184-86.
26. Id. at 186.
27. The decision was to be recommendatory with respect to states that were not
parties to the convention but were eligible to participate in the decision on "joint
action." Id. at 187.
28. Id. at 186, 188.
29. See Lissitzyn, Hijacking, International Law and Human Rights, in AERIAL
PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 116.
30. See generally Summary of the Work of the Legal Committee during ItsEighteenth Session, Legal Committee, Eighteenth Session, ICAO Doc. 8936-LC/164--2,
at 1-55 (1970).
31. See generally Report of the Subcommittee on the Council Resolutions of I
October 1970, ICAO Doc. LC/SC CR - Report, April 27, 1971. The draft convention
is reproduced as annex D to the Report.
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in Vienna, rolled back the Council decisions of October 1 and removed
the subject of "joint action" from the active part of the Work Pro-
gramme of the Legal Committee. 2 It was clear that a proposal for
subjecting actions by states to vigorous examination and, possibly,
condemnation, through the implementation of sanctions, was too abrupt
a departure from previous steps taken to deal with hijacking. At the
time it appeared to be too radical a solution for a problem the serious-
ness of which was not yet fully comprehended.
One year later, in June 1972, at the 19th Session of the ICAO
Legal Committee, the United States proposed that the question of
"joint action" be taken up again, and moved that the subject matter
of the October 1 Resolutions be given the highest priority on the Legal
Committee's Work Programme. The proposal was defeated 5 to 19
with 15 abstentions. The prevailing view was that there was no basis
for overruling, in effect, a decision taken by the Assembly only 1 year
earlier. On the same day, the massacre at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv
took place. Twenty-seven persons were killed and more than 80 injured
by terrorists who had concealed machine guns in baggage on an Air
France flight. Shortly thereafter, a United States plane was hijacked
to Algeria with a $300,000 ransom; a hijacking from Czechoslovakia
to West Germany of a Czechoslovak aircraft resulted in the death
of the pilot; and earlier in the spring a Lufthansa aircraft had been
hijacked to Yemen and ransomed for $5 million. Because govern-
ments had failed to deal adequately with such hijacking, the Interna-
tional Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations called for a world-
wide 24-hour shutdown of services by pilots on June 19, 1972, and
demanded that work be completed on the United States-Canadian
draft convention on "joint action."33
Once again, the United States pressed in the ICAO Council for
rapid action to complete work on a convention which would provide
for sanctions against states that did not punish hijackers. The draft
resolution requested an immediate meeting of the Legal Subcommittee
to complete its work. The resolution was adopted by the Council
on June 19, 1972, by a vote of 17 to 1.34
32. The Assembly decision was taken in a roll-call vote of 28 to 26.
33. See note 22 supra.
34. The Council Resolution reads in pertinent part:
DIRECTS the Legal Committee to convene immediately a Special Subcommittee
to work on the preparation of an international convention to establish appropriate
multilateral procedures within the ICAO framework for determining whether there
is a need for joint action in cases envisaged in the first Resolution adopted by
the Council on 1 October 1970 and for deciding on the nature of joint action
if it is to be taken.
The complete text is reproduced at annex C of the Report of the Special Subcom-
mittee on the Council Resolution of 19 June 1972, ICAO Doc. LC/SC CR - Report,
Sept. 15, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Report of the Subcommittee].
[VOL. 18 : p. 9851028
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The Subcommittee met in Washington, D.C., from September 4
to 15, 1972. In consultations during the summer preceding the meet-
ing, the United States sought agreement on provisions of a draft Air
Security Enforcement Convention which could receive broad support
from the 17 nations composing the membership of the Subcommittee. 5
These consultations revealed the basic agreement of a number of mem-
bers with a fundamental part of the United States-Canadian draft -
the two-step procedure separating a factfinding stage from the stage
in which collective action would be considered. For the factfinding
stage, it was proposed that an independent commission be established
composed of nine members who would serve in a private capacity as
experts on air law and not as government representatives. They would
be responsible for making determinations as to whether a state had
acted consistently with the basic aviation security principles set out
in the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions. In the second stage,
either the ICAO Council or, if it did not act, designated states, would
decide whether sanctions should be taken and what their nature
should be. At an early stage in the Subcommittee deliberations, the
United States introduced major revisions in the original proposal
reflecting modifications which resulted from the summer consultations. 6
The Subcommittee ultimately adopted a proposal on stage two which
was advanced jointly by Canada, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, and the United States to be forwarded to the Legal Committee
for study. Intensive study of stage one produced 11 articles of a
convention text." The Subcommittee recommended that the Legal
Committee be convened to consider its work as soon as possible. It
did not, however, actually approve any draft articles; its recommenda-
tion was only for more study.38 Again, I only mention these develop-
ments since the Subcommittee work was superseded by events in
January 1973.
On September 25, 1972, Secretary Rogers addressed the United
Nations General Assembly on the subject of terrorism and, in the
course of his speech, proposed that a diplomatic conference on air
security enforcement be convened without delay.39 On September 28,
1972, the United States introduced a resolution in the ICAO Council
35. Members of the Subcommittee were Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Egypt, France, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Tanzania, U.S.S.R.,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Australia attended as an observer.
The Congo and India were invited to be members of the Subcommittee, but did not
attend.
36. See Report of the Subcommittee, supra note 34, at apps. L & M.
37. Id. at paras. 53-57.8 & app. F. For the complete text of the draft articles
prepared by the Subcommittee, see 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 361 (1972).
38. See Report of the Subcommittee, supra note 34, at paras. 67 & 67.1.
39. See 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425 (1972).
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calling for a diplomatic conference as soon as it could be scheduled.
On November 1, 1972, the ICAO Council decided to convene the
Legal Committee in January 1973, to review the work of the Sub-
committee, and scheduled a diplomatic conference for August 21 to
September 11, 1973.40
Let me pause for a moment to explain the primary objections
which had been raised to the United States proposal for an Air
Security Enforcement Convention.4 1 A fundamental legal question
was posed by the USSR and France; they took the position that, in
accordance with article 41 of the United Nations Charter, implemen-
tation of sanctions is an exclusive function of the Security Council.
Egypt has also argued that boycotts are a form of enforcement action
requiring prior authorization of the Security Council in accordance
with article 53(1) of the Charter. We have taken the position that
article 41 does not endow the Security Council with exclusive powers
over collective action of all kinds for all purposes; neither the legislative
history nor the plain language of the article justifies such an inter-
pretation. The observer from the United Nations at the Washington
Legal Subcommittee meeting, would appear to have taken the same
position in a paper submitted to the meeting which described a number
of precedents in which states have agreed to certain forms of con-
certed action. 2 As to the argument about article 53, we are of the
view that it is simply misapplied with respect to this proposal, and it
has not been pursued by others.
Another line of argument has been that the United States pro-
posal, in attempting to enforce principles set out in the Tokyo, Hague,
and Montreal Conventions, can only be applied to parties contracting
to those conventions; if it is applied to noncontracting states it would
violate articles 34, 35, and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,4" by, in effect, requiring states to be bound to treaties
without their consent. Of course, if the proposed convention does not
apply to noncontracting states, one can question whether it is of any
utility at all. Current problems in obtaining punishment of hijackers
have nothing to do with states which have accepted the Tokyo, Hague,
and Montreal obligations, but with those which do not. Thus, as
40. On March 7, 1973, this decision was confirmed by the ICAO Council and
a final schedule for the conference, to meet in Rome, was set for Aug. 28 to Sept.
21, 1973.
41. See generally notes 30, 31 & 34 supra.
42. See Report of the Subcommittee, supra note 34, at app. P.
43. The Vienna Convention has been signed by 47 states, and 18 of the required
35 acceptances for entry into force have been deposited. The United States has
signed but has not ratified it.
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a purely practical matter, there is only one sensible and obvious
conclusion to make on this point.
Moving from the practical to the legal, articles 34-36 of the Vienna
Convention are totally misconstrued if tied to the question of an en-
forcement convention. These articles are concerned with whether
treaty provisions can be legally binding on third states, 4 not with
whether a group of states can work to encourage certain state conduct
by acting in concert. We believe there is a basic obligation on states
to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of the
international aviation system.45 Certainly, that cannot be doubted
for the 126 parties to the Chicago Convention. 4' To breach that obli-
gation of Chicago is to lose the rights of Chicago.4 7 These can be taken
away by each party in a unilateral decision, or by all parties in a
series of coordinated steps. The Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Con-
ventions set down basic rules of state conduct necessary to preserve
a safe aviation system. The aviation community can act in concert to
enforce these rules by, if necessary, excluding a state from the com-
munity through an air boycott.48
To summarize this point, we do not argue that the Hague Con-
vention provisions are legally binding on third parties because that
would contradict the Vienna rules. We simply take the position that
states collectively may take any designated action not otherwise
prohibited in law in the event another state fails to observe the prin-
ciples set out in the Hague Convention.
There has also been resistance to the United States initiatives
on air security enforcement stemming from reasons of policy as well
as legal grounds. A great stumbling block has been our proposal for
binding sanctions. Many states cannot agree; they argue that freedom
of choice to impose sanctions in each individual case must be preserved.
They find the idea that they could be required to impose sanctions
in a case in which they voted against sanctions especially abhorrent.
Our view has been that it is necessary to give up such freedom in
order to make an enforcement convention a more effective tool.
44. This is clear from article 38, which refers to the circumstances in which a
third state can become legally bound to a rule set forth in a treaty.
45. See AERIAL PIRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 19-20, 25-26,213.
46. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591 (effective April 4, 1947) [hereinafter cited as Chicago
Convention]. The Preamble and articles 4, 25, 44(a), (b), (d), and (i) are par-
ticularly on point.
47. The Vienna Convention provides for termination and suspension of a treaty
as a consequence of its breach. See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, at arts. 60 & 65.
48. See Statement by Charles N. Brower at the Opening Session of the 1972
Subcommittee, in 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 358 (1972).
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It is argued that an air security enforcement convention can
never be effective, because it will never be widely ratified. That makes
an assumption that I am unwilling to accept, and prejudges both what
is "effective" and what constitutes "wide ratification." To the extent
such a convention can focus the pressures of the aviation community
against states which do not act to curb air security threats, its salutary
effect should not be disparaged ab initio. Nevertheless, as action
at the Legal Committee meeting last month indicated, our views have
not persuaded sufficient numbers.
Shortly before the January 1973 ICAO session began, France
introduced a novel proposal and undertook a major diplomatic initiative
to gain support for it.49 The proposal consisted of an amendment to
the 1944 Chicago Convention incorporating the obligations of the
Hague and Tokyo Conventions but not mentioning the Montreal Con-
vention. The proposal also called for application of article 94(b) of
the Chicago Convention so that any member state failing to ratify
the amendment within 1 year after the amendment entered into force
would automatically be expelled from ICAO. In order to obtain
approval of the amendment it is necessary, under the Chicago Conven-
tion, to obtain a two-thirds vote of the ICAO Assembly, presently 84
votes. Ultimate entry into force requires at least the same number
of ratifications.5" The proposal, therefore, is one which is not likely
to be adopted and take effect in the immediate or near future. Whether
it would ever enter into force is, at best, dubious.
As the Legal Committee convened, the United Kingdom, later
joined by Switzerland, put forth its own proposal to amend the Chi-
cago Convention, which was, in substance, partially stronger than the
French proposal.51 In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany
advanced its own modification of the proposal for a "joint action"
convention. 52
49. The French proposal is found in the working documents of the 20th Session
(Special) of the Legal Committee, Jan. 9-30, 1972. ICAO Doc. LC/WD 821.
50. Article 94 reads:
(a) Any proposed amendment to this Convention must be approved by a
two-thirds vote of the Assembly and shall then come into force in respect of
States which have ratified such amendment when ratified by the number of con-
tracting States specified by the Assembly. The number so specified shall not be
less than two-thirds of the total number of contracting States.
(b) If in its opinion the amendment is of such a nature as to justify this
course, the Assembly in its resolution recommending adoption may provide that
any State which has not ratified within a specified period after the amendment
has come into force shall thereupon cease to be a member of the Organization
and a party to the Convention.
The Chicago Convention, supra note 46, art. 94.
51. ICAO Doc. LC/WD 829.
52. ICAO Doc. LC/WD 825.
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Faced with this variety of proposals, and the aforementioned
legal and political objections, the Legal Committee first debated and
adopted a series of principles which severely restricted possibilities
for a useful independent convention. The following principles were
adopted to be applied to any new international instrument the Legal
Committee would draw up: (1) there should be no investigation of
behavior of a state not party to the new instrument without its con-
sent; (2) there should be no joint action against a nonparty; and
(3) there should be no provision for sanctions against parties. The
lone positive vote from the American point of view was one agreeing
to the principle that "recommendations" can be made to states which
are not parties to the new instrument. On the basis of these votes,
the Nordic delegations to the Legal Committee eventually sponsored
the completion of a draft convention providing for factfinding and
recommendations. The draft falls far short of our desires, but we feel
it could be a useful instrument.13
Faced with widely varying proposals, none commanding a clear
majority of support, the Legal Committee ultimately concluded that
the only alternative to a complete failure would be to approve all major
proposals which had not been withdrawn or rejected by the votes
on principles. The Legal Committee thus recommended to the ICAO
Council that it convene an extraordinary session of the ICAO Assembly
to discuss the French proposal and the United Kingdom-Swiss proposal,
since amendments to the Chicago Convention must be approved by
an Assembly rather than by the Council, and to convene a diplomatic
conference to consider the Nordic proposal for an independent con-
vention. The diplomatic conference was also asked to consider a long-
standing Soviet proposal for an optional protocol to the Hague and
Montreal Conventions making extradition of offenders covered by
the two conventions mandatory, thus eliminating the alternative of
prosecution. 4
It is our view that the Nordic proposal must be adopted if there
is to be enhanced enforcement of the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal
obligations. The Nordic proposal embraces the general obligations
of states with respect to an alleged offender, as set out in the Tokyo,
Hague, and Montreal Conventions, and provides that a contracting
state may call upon the ICAO Council to consider whether a violation
of any of these obligations has occurred. The Council may then appoint
a commission of experts to investigate, if the state whose behavior is
53. ICAO Doc. LC/WD 821 (revised).
54. ICAO Doc. LC/WD 826.
1033JUNE 1973]
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 6 [1973], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss6/6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
involved is a party or has given its consent. The proposal also pro-
vides that the ICAO Council may make recommendations to the state
whose action is involved. If the Council fails to act or if the state
whose action is involved does not comply with the Council's recom-
mendations, the Secretary-General of ICAO, at the request of a party,
may convene a conference, which, in turn, may make recommenda-
tions to the state whose action is involved.
At the recent ICAO Legal Committee meeting the United States
strongly opposed, and it continues to oppose, any amendment to the
Chicago Convention as the exclusive means of ensuring enforcement
of existing obligations. Any amendment to Chicago, as already noted,"
would require such a substantial number of ratifications that it is
unlikely to enter into force in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the
French proposal has the additional drawback of having expulsion
from ICAO as its only sanction: a sanction not necessarily propor-
tional to the conduct of the offending state.
The United States is hopeful that the Nordic proposal can be
refined in such a way as to make it an acceptable instrument in our
effort to put teeth into existing international law in the area of inter-
national civil aviation. It would be our hope that this can be done
at the diplomatic conference which is scheduled to commence in August
1973.
It was mentioned earlier that the primary source of the continuing
hijacking problem lies in the simple fact that states lack the will to
stop it. It has even been in the interest of a very few states, at least
under certain circumstances, to tolerate it. Why, one may ask, would
there be a will to impose sanctions, if some states are unwilling to
take the seemingly less complex step of punishing hijackers?
The question suggests that all states, or a vast majority, must
agree to implement a decision to impose sanctions in order for sanc-
tions to be effective. I do not hold this view. Political and economic
pressures can be applied to states which fail to take action against
hijacking by the concerted action of only a group of concerned states.
I do not believe any country has a real governmental interest in
becoming a sanctuary state for hijackers. Hijackers have been per-
mitted to go free in the past because the decision has not "cost" any-
thing, or because the general threat to international aviation has
appeared too remote. Concerted action by a group of states in a par-
ticular case can be highly disruptive for the recalcitrant state and,
hopefully, lead to a reassessment of policy as the "cost" of any
55. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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decision to let hijackers go unpunished rises. To date, the pressures
generated against such a state have been haphazard and diluted. An
Air Security Enforcement Convention could organize, channel, and
direct them.
I think the alternative to strong, organized government action
is an invitation to disasters. Perhaps hijacking has been tolerated in
some places because a major tragedy has not yet been attributed to it.
Failure to take decisive action to eliminate hijacking sanctuaries
will be, in my mind, a major abdication of governmental responsibility
to the chance of events and private groups, such as the International
Air Line Pilots' Association and the International Federation of Trans-
port Workers, who will seek enforcement of the law through efforts
of their own if governments will not.
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